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AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS ANNO-
TATED WITH KENTUCKY DECISIONS*
By FRANK MURRAY**
Assignment of Contracts
SECTION
154. What future rights may be
assigned.
155. A right which is condition-
al or arises under an irre-
vocable offer may be effec-
tively assigned.
156. Partial assignments.
157. A right can be effectively
assigned orally or by writ-
ing.
158. In what cases gratuitous
assignments are revocable.
159. In what cases an effective
assignment may be made
without assent by the as-
signee.
SECTION
160. Delegation of performance
of a duty or a condition.
161. Assignment of rights under
a bilateral contract.
162. In what cases assent to an
assignment of a right or
to the delegated perform-
ance of a duty. precludes
subsequent objection.
163. In what cases an order is
an assignment.
164. Interpretation of words
purporting to assign a bi-
lateral contract and effect
of acceptance of the as-
signment by the assignee.
Section 154. What Future Rights May Be Assigned.
(1) Except as stated in Section 151, a right expected to
arise in the future, under a contract or employment in existence
at the time of the assignment, can be effectively assigned.
(2) An assignment of a right expected to arise under a
contract or employment not then existing is operative only as a
promise by the assignor to assign the right and an authorization
to the assignee to enforce it, but neither imposes a duty upon
the obligor nor precludes garnishment by the obligee's creditors.
Annotation:
The Kentucky decisions are in accord with this section.
Subsection (1) is illustrated by the assignment of the right to re-
ceive money made before payment is due as in Carpenter v. Dummit,
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221 Ky. 67, 297 S. W. 695 and Richie v. Crafle, 108 Ky. 483, 56 S. W.
963 or by the assignment of rights under option contracts as in Ches-
brough v. Vizarf Inv. Co., 156 Ky. 149, 160 S. W. 725.
This section has a special reference to the assignment of unearned
wages which, if not prohibited by statute or public policy (see the
annotations to Sec. 151-b) and if the requirements of K. S. See. 4758
are followed, are valid provided the wages are to be earned under a
contract then existing--Manly v. Bitzer, 91 Ky. 596, 16 S. W. 464;
Boone v. Connelly, 12 K. L. R. 190 and dictum in Holt v. Thurman,
111 Ky. 84, 63 S. W. 280 and Levi v. Loevenhart, 138 Ky. 133, 127 S. W.
748 (In the latter case the assignment was to continue "until my in-
debtedness . . . is settled" and it was held thaf the assignment was
terminated by the bankruptcy of the assignor).
Subsection (2) is followed by our court in the frequent statement
that a mere possibility or expectancy is not assignable. No case has
been found involving an assignment of wages where the contract or
employment did not exist at the time, but it is safe to say that the
existence of a contract is an essential element and without it the at-
tempted assignment would be ineffective. See Manly v. Bitzer, supra.
It has been held that an assignment of interest to be earned on de-
posits thereafter made is invalid against a subsequent lien acquired by
an attaching creditor of the assignor-Peoples Bank v. Barbour, 12
K. L. R. 231.
This subsection also covers what is commonly called "catching
bargains with heirs". That attempted assignments of expectancies by
prospective heirs are invalid, see Penlley v. Lee, 283 Ky. 372, 25 S. W.
(2d) 1030; Riggsby v. Montgomery, 208 Ky. 524, 271 S. W. 564; Snyder
v. Snyder, 193 Ky. 233, 235 S. W. 743; Hunt v. Smith, 191 Ky. 443, 230
S. W. 936; Burton v. Campbell, 176 Ky. 495, 195 S. W. 1091; Furnish's
Admr. v. Lilly, 27 K. L. R. 226, 84 S. W. 734; and other cases cited
below.
We do not follow the Restatement in treating the ineffective as-
signment as a promise to assign in these cases. Since our decisions
are based not only pn the impossibility of transferring that which is
not in esse, but also on public policy, the attempted assignment is
absolutely void. After the death of the ancestor, the property is sub-
ject to levy and sale by a creditor of the assignor-Alves v. Schlesinger,
81 Ky. 290; Mcfall's Admr. v. Hampton, 98 Ky. 166, 32 S. W. 406. The
assignee is treated as a party to an illegal contract and can neither
enforce it nor recover damages for its breach. He cannot recover the
value of improvements placed on the land, at least for those placed
before the death of the ancestor, nor can he recover the consideration
paid for the assignment. A warranty contained in the deed of assign-
ment is also void.-Hunt v. Smith, 191 Ky. 443, 230 S. W. 936; Spears
v. Spaw, 118 S. W. 275. But see Lowry v. Spear, 70 Ky. (7 Bush) 451
(Allowing recovery on a special covenant for indemnity but limited to
the consideration received.)
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The intended assignee cannot invoke an estoppel based on the
deed of assignment, nor benefit by the inuring of after-acquired title,
although the deed contains a covenant of warranty-Riggsby v. Mont-
gomery, 208 Ky. 524, 271 S. W. 564; Hunt v. Smith, 191 Ky. 443, 230
S. W. 936; Burton v. Campbell, 176 Ky. 495, 195 S. W. 1091; Spears V.
Spaw, 118 S.-'W. 275; McDowell v. Weal, 5 K. L. R. 331. However, if
after the death of the ancestor, the heir stands by while there is a
Judicial sale of the assignee's claim to an innocent purchaser and al-
lows the purchaser to enter and make improvements, he may assert
his right to the land only upon refund of the purchase money and
payment for the improvements-Flatt v. Flatt, 189 Ky. 801, 225 S. W.
1067.
It is immaterial that the assignment is made to a co-heir-Hall v.
Hall, 153 Ky. 379, 155 S. W. 755; Furnish's Admr. v. Lilly, supra;
Wheeler's Exr. v. Wheeler, 59 Ky. (2 Mete.) 474; Alves v. Schlesinger,
81 Ky. 290. Or that it is a release to the ancestor himself-Wedding-
ton v. Adkins, 54 S. W. (2d) 331; Pendley v. Lee, 233 Ky. 372, 25 S. W.
(2d) 1030; Elliott v. Leslie, 124 Ky. 533, 99 S. W. 69.
Knowledge and acquiescence of the ancestor imparts no validity to
these attempted assignments-Wheeler's Exr. v. Wheeler, 59 Ky. (2
Mete.) 474; Alves v. Schlesinger, 81 Ky. 290; Elliott v. Leslie, 124 Ky.
555, 99 S. W. 619; Spears v. Spaw, 118 S. W. 275; Hall v. Hall, 153 Ky.
379, 155 S. W. 755. And the fact that the consent is given in writing is
wholly immaterial-Burton v. Campbell, 176 Ky. 495, 195 S. W. 1091.
However, if the ancestor executes a separate writing sufficient to pass
title or to bind himself in the disposition of the property to the as-
signee, he takes, not under the assignment, but by virtue of the grant-
McBee v. Meyers, 67 Ky. (4 Bush) 356; Lee v. Lee, 63 Ky. (2 Duv.)
134. And if the ancestor join in the deed of assignment it has this
same effect-Snyder v. Snyder, 193 Ky. 233, 235 S. W. 743 (holding
that the intended assignee is entitled to the described property-
undivided share of mothers' estate-thus reducing the shares of other
heirs; that the heir-assignor may still claim a distributive share of the
residue less the value of the consideration received by him which is
treated as an advancement). I
Section 155. A Right which is Conditional or Arises Under
an Irrevocable Offer may be Effectively Assigned.
A right which is conditional or arises from an irrevocable
offer is not for that reason incapable of effective assignment.
Annotation:
Kentucky decisions are in accord with this section. The fact that
the right is conditional will not prevent its assignment-Armstrong
Mfg. Co. v. Gardner, 209 Ky. 93, 272 S. W. 22; Shuttleworth v. Ky. Coal
& Iron Dev. Co., 22 K. L. R. 1341, 60 S. W. 534. A life insurance policy
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Is assignable-Thompson's Exr'x v. Thompson, 190 Ky. 3, 226 S. W.
350; Jeadows v. Meadows, 13 K. L. R. 495. An option is assignable-
Chesbrough v. Vizard Inv. Co., 156 Ky. 149, 160 S. W. 725.
Of course, the transfer, even to a bona fide assignee does not make
the obligation absolute-Armstrong Mfg. Co. v. Gardner, supra; Shut-
teworth v. Kentucky Coal, etc., Co., supra.
Section 156. Partial Assignments.
An assignment of either a fractional part of a single and
entire right against an obligor, or of a stated amount fron such
a right, is operative as to that part or amount to the same extent
and in the same manner as if the part had been a separate right,
subject to the limitation that if the obligor has not contracted to
make such a partial performance no legal proceeding can be
maintained by such an assignee against the obligor over his ob-
jection, unless all persons having collectively a right to the en-
tire performance are joined in the proceeding.
Comment:
a. Several different kinds of transactions may be entered into
by those who seek to transfer a partial interest in a right:
(1) An intention may be manifested that the assignee shall en-
force the entire right against the debtor, and, having done so,
shall retain part for himself and turn over the remainder to
the assignor.
(2) It may be contemplated that the assignor shall enforce the
whole right against the debtor and shall turn over a portion
of what he collects to the so-called assignee.
(3) It may be contemplated that the assignee shall be authorized
to demand from the debtor directly payment of his portion of
the right, but shall not be authorized to demand payment of
the whole.
b. A transaction of the first sort is a total assignment although
as to a portion of the amount collected the assignee is a trustee for
the assignor. The statements, therefore, in regard to total assignments
are applicable.
c. In cases of the second type there is no assignment, there is
merely a promise to pay out of a fund collected in the future. It is
cases of the third class that are covered by the present Section and
which are properly referred to as partial d-ssignments.
Annotation:
The Kentucky decisions do not agree in all respects with this
section. Although we recognize the right of a partial assignee against
his assignor or subsequently acquired claims of third parties-Lex-
ington Brewing Co. v. Hamon, 155 Ky. 711, 160 S. W. 264 (superior to
K. L. J.-7
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a subsequent assignment of the entire claim); Lutter v. Grosse, 26
K. L. R. 585, 82 S. W. 935 (superior to a subsequent attachment by a
creditor of the assignor); Columbia Trust & Finance Co. v. First Nat'l.
Bank, 116 Ky. 364, 76 S. W. 156 (superior to a subsequent conflicting
partial assignment); 0. H. Brown Banking Co. v. Stockton, 107 Ky.
492, 54 S. IV. 854 (superior to a subsequent mortgagee); Prichard v.
Warner's Assignee, 4 K. L. R. 349 (if the debt is secured, a partial
assignee is entitled to a pro rata interest in the security); Summers v.
Kilgus, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 449 (same) and a partial assignee may re-
cover on a cross-petition against a debtor who has not paid-Kentucky
Lbr., Etc., Co. v. Montz, 158 Ky. 328, 164 S. W. 935-or set off the assigned
claim in an action by the debtor-Miller v. Malony, 42 Ky. (3 B. Mon.)
105. In fact it has frequently been said that a partial assignee will
be protected where it can be done without working a .hardship on the
debtor, but unfortunately this has not applied and it has been held that
a debtor who has not consented to the partial assignment may dis-
charge his obligation by payment to the assignor although he has
notice of the assignment-Henry Clay Fire Ins. Co. v. Denker's Exr's.,
218 Ky. 68, 290 S. W. 1047. See also the dictum in Kentucky Lbr. Etc.
Co. v. Montz, supra and Columbia Trust and Finance Co. V. First Nat'l
Bank, supra. Although it has been held that death will not revoke an
unaccepted partial assignment for value--Just's Admr. v. Woodman, 147
Ky. 493, 144 S. W. 379 and Section 163, infra-recent decisions have
been based on the supposition that such assignments are revocable by
the act of the assignor-Stewart v. Continental Casualty Co., 229 Ky.
634, 17 S. W. (2d) 745; Inter-Ocean Casualty Co. v. Dunn, 219 Ky.
103, 292 S. W. 742. (These decisions may be justified since they involve
assignments of wages so that under our statute an, acceptance is
necessary, but they seemingly adopt the broader dictum found in
Wallin's Creek Collieries Co. v. Saylor, 214 Ky. 206, 282 S. W. 1095).
We agree with the Restatement in holding that, if the debtor has
not consented to the partial assignment, no legal proceedings can be
maintained against him by the assignee-Henry Clay Fire Ins. Co. v.
Decker's Bx'r., supra; Weinstock v. Bellwood, 75 Ky. (12 Bush) 139;
Bank of Gallioplis v. Trimble, 48 Ky. (6 B. Mon.) 599; Elledge v.
Straughn, 41 Ky. (2 B. Mon.) 81; Snelling v. Boyd, 21 Ky. (5 T. B.
Mon.) 172. But we have not allowed the assignee to sue although all
persons having collectively a right to the entire performance are
joined-Weinstock v. Bellwood, supra (Right to sue denied although
the assignor was joined); Hubbard v. Pranther, 4 Ky. (1 Bibb) 178;
Snelling v. Boyd, 21 Ky. (5 T. B. Mon.) 172 (Two partial assignees
cannot sue although between them they have the entire beneficial in-
terest. This decision is probably based on the ground that the as-
signors were joint owners and assigned separately, see Sec. 153);
Jarman v. Howard, 10 Ky. (3 A. K. M.) 383 (A owed B and C. B as-
signed to C. Although A assents to the assignment, C cannot sue
without joining B.)
A. Ij. I. RESTATEMENT OF LAw OF CONTRACTS
Section 157. A Right can be Effectively Assigned Orally
or by Writing.
A right can be effectively assigned either orally or by a
writing.
Annotation:
The Kentucky decisions are in accord with this statement. An
oral assignment is valid-Newby v. Hill, 59 Ky. (2 Mete.) 530; Varnon
v. Chestnut, 8 K. L. R. 428; Beard v. Sharp, 23 K. L. R. 1582, 65 S. W.
810. It is superior to a subsequent written assignment-Lexington
Brewing Co. v. Hamon, 155 Ky. 711, 160 S. W. 264. Although the chose
is evidenced by a writing it may be assigned orally-Armstrong v.
Gardner, 209 Ky. 93, 272 S. W. 22 (Commission certificates); .Guenther
& Bro. v. Cary & MarbZe, 17 K. L. R. 1262, 34 S. W. 232 (Fire Insurance
Policy). An oral assignment of wages, coming within the provisions of
K. S. Sec. 4758, would be ineffective.
Section 158. In What Cases Gratuitous Assignments are
Revocable.
(1) The right acquired by the assignee under a gratuitous
assignment is revocable by the assignor's death, by a subsequent
assignment by the assignor, or by notice from the assignor re-
ceived by the assignee or by obligor, unless,
(a) the assignment is in a.writing either under seal or of such
a nature as to be capable ol transferring title to a chattel
without delivery thereof and without consideration; or
(b) the assigned right is evidenced by a tangible token or writing.
the surrender of which is required by the obligor's contract
for its enforcement, and this token or writing is delivered to
the assignee; or
(c) the assignor should reasonably expect the assignment to induce
action or forebearance of a definite and substantial character
on one part of the assignee, and such action or forbearance is
induced.
(2) If an assignee holding an assignment revocable because
gratuitous obtains before revocation,
(a) payment or satisfaction of the obligation, or
(b) judgment against the obligor, or
(c) a new contract of the obligor by novation,
he can hold what he has thus acquired. Whatever he obtains
after revocation can be recovered from him by the assignor.
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Annotation:
This section opens up the whole question of gifts of choses in
action. The Kentucky decisions are generally in accord with the state-
ment that, except in the three cases mentioned, a gratuitous assign-
ment is revocable by the death of the assignor-Cincinnati Finance
Co. v. Atkinson's Adm'r., 235 Ky. 582, 31 S. W. (2d) 890; Combs v.
Roark's Adm'r., 221 Ky. 679, 299 S. W. 576; Bowles v. Rutroif, 216 KY.
657, 288 S. W. 312; Smith's Adm'r. V. Smith, 214 Ky. 785, 284 S. W. 83
-or by a subsequent act of the assignor-Keley-Koett Mfg. Co. v.
Geldenbert, 207 Ky. 690, 270 S. W. 15; White v. White, 229 Ky. 666;
17 S. W. (2d) 733. However, in a few cases, the incomplete gift or
assignment without delivery has been held to be irrevocable as a
declaration of trust-Thompson's Ex'r. v. Thompson, 190 Ky. 3, 226
S. W. 350; Williamson v. Yager, 91 Ky. 282, 15 S. W. 660; Roche v.
George's Ex'r., 13 K. L. R. 493. But see Cincinnati Finance Co. v.
Atkinson's Aam'r., supra.
(a) A gratuitous assignment is irrevocable if it is in a writing
of such a nature as to be capable of transferring title to a chattel
without delivery or consideration, and if the writing itself is delivered
-Taylor v. Purdy, 151 Ky. 82, 151 S. W. 45 (a "deed of gift" of per-
sonal property is a valid and irrevocable assignmefit of notes held by
the donor although they are not delivered to the donee); Weber v.
Salisbury, 149 Ky. 327, 148 S. W. 34 (order on a bank to pay entire
deposit to donee); Malone's Com. v. Lebus, 116 Ky. 975, 7 7 S. W. 180
(recital in a deed that interest on a purchase-money note is to be paid
to a named donee is an irrevocable assignment although the note
itself is not delivered). See also Gordon v. Young's Admr.,.10 K. L. R.
681. That there must be a delivery of the writing, see Baldwin's Ezr.
V. Barber's Rx'rs., 151 Ky. 168, 151 S. W. 686; Payne v. Powell, 68 Ky.
(5 Bush) 248.
(b) A gratuitous assignment is irrevocable if there is a delivery
to the assignee of a tangible token which is required by the obligor's
contract for its enforcement-Williams v. Letton, 228 Ky. 371, 15 S. W.
(2d) 296 (postal saving certificates); Trevathan's Exr. v. Dees' Ezr.,
221 Ky. 396, 298 S. W. 975 (Certificate of deposit and bank stock);
Hale v. Hale, 189 Ky. 171, 224 S. W. 1078 (Bonds); Goodan v. Goodan,
184 Ky. 79, 211 S. W. 423 (Certificate of deposit, notes and bonds);
McCoy's Admr. v. McCoy, 126 Ky. 783, 104 S. W. 1031 (Saviigs Bank
book); Denunzio's Receiver v. Schlotz, 117 Ky. 191, 77- S. W. 715 (.Stock
certificate); Burge V. Burge's Admr., 25 K. L. R. 979, 76 S. W. 873
(Certificate of indebtedness); Broaddus v. Broaddus, 16 K. L. R. 330,
27 S. W. 989 (Notes); Meadow's Guardian v. Meadow's Admr., 13 K.
L. R. 495 (Life insurance policy); Miller v. Owens, 11 K. L. R. 440
(Notes); Strelow v. 'Vonderhide's Ex'r., 3 K. L. R. 472 (Notes). De-
livery may be to the assignee or to someone for him-Williams v. Let-
ton, Goodan v. Goodan, Burge V. Burge's Admr., supra; Meriwether v.
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Morrison, 78 Ky. .572; Sunderland v. Sunderland's Admr., 68 Ky. (5
Bush) 591. See also Sec. 159 (c).
Seemingly as an extension on this doctrine, the Court has held the
assignment irrevocable where the token delivered was not required
for the enforcement of the obligation, bit was merely evidence of it.
In this the Court has turned from the necessity of surrender of con-
trol to the mere requirement there shall be satisfactory evidence of
the assignment. See Jones' Admr. v. Moore, 102 Ky. 591, 44 S. W. 126
(D-elivery of an account book); Stephenson's Admr. v. King, 81 Ky.
425 (Delivery of a letter from an agent describing certain bonds which
he held for the assignor). In McCoy's Adm'r. v. McCoy, supra, it is
said that the delivery of a pass book will be sufficient to sustain an
assignment of a checking account after the death of the assignor.
However, it was held otherwise in the earlier case of Ashbrooc v.
Ryan, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 228. In another case the assignment was held
to be irrevocable because a third party refused to give up the token
for delivery-Simmonds v. Simmonds' Adm'r., 133 Ky. 493, 118 S. W.
304.
The same idea has been mistakenly applied in cases involving an
oral change of beneficiary of a life insurance policy, and it has been
held that such a change is possible if the policy is delivered to the
new beneficiary-Lockett v. Lockett, 26 K. L. R. 300, 80 S. W. 1152-
but not otherwise-Hardin v. Hardin, 191 Ky. 331, 230 S. W. 307. See
Sec. 142.
If it is an assignment or gift causa mortis, the statements of this
section gpply only to the extent that the death of the assignor will
not revoke the assignment. Although there has be'n a delivery of a
tangible token, the assignment may be revoked by act of the assignor.
Drake v. Security Trust Co., 203 Ky. 733, 262 S. W. 4; Lisle v. Trimble,
92 Ky. 304, 17 S. W. 742.
(c) That a gratuitous assignor may be estopped, see the dictum
in Lisle v. Tribble, 92 Ky. 304, 17 S. W. 742.
The statements in Subsection (2) would probably be followed in
Kentucky. Even when we treated a check as an assignment (see Sec.
163, infra.) a gift of the donor's own check for part of the funds on
deposit, was not such a writing or tangible token that prevented revo-
cation by the act or death of the donor, but the cases all admit that it
there had been acceptance or payment by the bank the gift would have
been complete-Foxworthy v. Adams, 136 Ky. 403, 124 S. W. 381;
Throgmorton v. Grigsby's Adm'r., 124 Ky. 512, 99 S. W. 650. In Bey-
nol 's Adm'r. v. Reynolds, 92 Ky. 556, 18 S. W. 793, it was held that a
novation made the assignment irrevocable.
Section 159. In what Cases an Effective Assignment may
be Made without Assent by the Assignee.
(1) An effective assignment may be made without assent
by the assignee in the following cases:
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(a) where the assignment is for value;
(b) where the assignment is in a writing either under seal or of
such a nature as to be capable of transferring title to a chattel
without delivery thereof and without consideration, and the
writing is delivered to some one other than the assignee;
(c) where a tangible token or writing, the surrender of which is
required by the obligor's contract for the enforcement of the
assigned right is delivered to some other than the assignee
with a manifestation of intent to transfer the right.
(2) In all cases than those stated in Subsection (1) a mani-
festation of assent by the assignee to the assignment is essential
to make it effective.
(3) Where an effective assignment is made without assent
by the assignee it is regarded as if it were void from the begin-
ning if he disclaims it within a reasonable time after acquiring
knowledge thereof, except that acts lawful when done cannot
by the disclaimer be made tortious.
Annotation:
The Kentucky decisions are in accord with this section.
(a) No Kentucky cases found
(b) Weber v. Salisbury, 149 Ky. 327, 148 S. W. 34 accord
(c) Williams v. Letton, 228 Ky. 371, 15 S. W. (2d) 296 (Where a
tangible token is delivered to a third person for the assignee, the as-
signmenit is valid "although the gift does not come to the knowledge
of the donee, and is not accepted by him until after the donor's death").
See also Meriwether v. Morrison, 78 Ky. 572; Kemper v. Kemper's
Adm'r., 62 Ky. (1 Duv.) 403. In a few cases, the Court talked of the
necessity of acceptance, but implied the acceptance as where the as-
signee is of unsound mind-Malone's Com. v. Lebus, 116 Ky. 975, 77
S. W. 180-or where the one receiving the writing is a joint donee, his
acceptance is said to inure to the benefit of the other donees-Goodan
v. Goodan, 184 Ky. 79, 211 S. W. 423.
Section 160. Delegation of Performance of a Duty or a
Condition.
(1) A delegation by an obligor. of the performance of a
duty which he owes, or by an obligee of the performance of a
condition to which his right is subject, is an authorization to
another to render the performance.
(2) Delegation may give to the person delegated an option
to render performance or not, and such an option may be given
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gratuitously or by contract; or the person delegated may bind
himself by contract conditionally or unconditionally to render
performance.
(3) Performance or offer of performance by a person dele-
gated has the same legal effect as performance or offer of per-
formance by the person named in the contract, unless,
(a) performance by the person delegated varies or would vary
materially from performance by the person named in the con-
tract as the one to perform, and there has been no such as-
sent to the delegation as is stated in Section 162, or
(b) the delegation is forbidden by statute or by the policy of the
common law, or
(c) the delegation of performance by an obligor, nor a contract
with the obligor by the person to whom the performance is
delegated to assume the obligor's duty, extinguishes it or pre-
vents recovery of damages from him if the duty is not per-
formed.
Annotation:
The language used in this section is not, as yet, found in the
Kentucky decisions. Our Court speaks of the delegation of perform-
ance as an "assignment of the contract" but clearly recognizes the
distinction between the assignment of rights and the delegation of
duties in F. Haag & Bros. v. Riechert, 142 Ky. 298, 134 S. W. 191. That
the person delegated may bind himself by contract and thus become
liable to the obligee in case of non-performance, see Frankfort & Cin-
cinnati y. Co. v. Jackson, 153 Ky. 534, 156 S. W. 103.. This is similar
to the cases involving the acceptance of a deed describing the land
as being subject to a mortgage. That this of itself does not create a
personal liability see Bush v. Louisville Trust Co., 24 K. L. R. 2182, 73
S. W. 775; Clay Fire Ins. Co. v. Hickman, 6 K. L. R. 308. But the
grantee may, by agreeing to assume the obligation, bind himself both
to the grantor and the mortgagee-Gray v. Gillim, 166 Ky. 194, 176
S. W. 22; Thompson v. McKee, 119 S. W. 229; Adams v. Morse, 4
K. L. R. 264. Cf. Sec. 164.
Subsection (3) states the effect of performance, or of an offer to
perform, by the person delegated in case the performance is delegable
and classifies the situation where an attempted delegation is ineffec-
tive without the assent of the obligee. Paragraph (a) of this sub-
section is perhaps too narrow to include all our decisions. It is true
that in most of these decisions, the difference between the perform-
ance the obligee would receive from the person delegated and that to
which Lie is entitled under the contract is seeiingly the deciding ele-
ment-Beard v. Beard, 200 Ky. 4, 254 S. W. 430 (A son cannot delegate
the performance of the contractual duty to furnish a home for his
mother); Davenport v. Gentry, 48 Ky. (9 B. Mon.) 427 (An indenture
KENTUCKY LAw JomRNAL
of apprenticeship is not assignable). There has been an attempt to
lay down a general rule that a contract which "involves a personal
liability, a relation of personal confidence, or calls for the skill or
experience of one of the parties" is not assignable-F. Haag & Bros. v.
Riechert, 142 Ky. 298, 134 S. W. 191, but a better statement is that
the power to delegate the performance of duties does not depend on
the subject matter of the contract, nor necessarily on the difference in
the performances, but upon the intent of the parties as drawn from tre
whole agreement or implied from the circumstances. If this shows
they expected to give and receive personal performance, ft cannot be
delegated.-Beard v. Beard, supra; Shultz & Co. v. Johnson's Ad'r.,
44 Ky. (5 B. Mon.) 497 (Holding that a contract to sell hemp "of his
own raising" was intended to be personal and hence is not assignable.)
Many other Kentucky cases, frequently cited by authorities under
the statement that personal contracts are not assignable, are not at-
tempts to delegate performance, but are assignments of rights and are
held.ineffective in an action at law solely because an agreement to pay
in services does not come under our statute. For example, see Henry
v. Hughes, 24 Ky. (1 J. J. M.) 453; Halbert v. Deering, 14 Ky. (4 Litt.)
9; and Force v. Thomason, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 166.
Of course the performance of the duty may be delegated where the
obligee assents-Pulaski Stave Co. v. Mifer's Creek Lbr. Co., 138 Ky.
273, 128 S. W. 96; F. Haag & Bros. v. Reichert, 142 Ky. 298, 134 S. W.
191 (Dictum).
Subsection (4) states the law in Kentucky. Frankfort & Cincinnati
Ry. Co. V. Jackson, 153 Ky. 534, 156 S. W. 103. "This (delegation),
however, is not an assignment of his liability, for he does not cease
to be liable if the work is not done by his assignee in accordance with
the contract"-Dictum in F. Haag & Bros. v. Reichert, dupra.
Section 161. Assignment of Rights Under a Bilateral
Contract.
Rights under a bilateral contract may be assigned as effec-
tively as rights under a unilateral contract; but duties on which
rights under a bilateral contract are conditional cannot be ex-
tinguished or varied materially by any assignnent.
Annotation:
This section states the law in Kentucky. Rights under a bilateral
contract are assignable even in those cases where the connected duties
would not be delegable, but the assignment alone does not extinguish
the liability of the assignor-Armstrong Mfg. Co. v. Gardner, 209 Ky.
93, 272 S. W. 22; F. Haag & Bros. v. Reichert, 142 Ky. 298, 134 S. W.
191. See also Pulaski Stave Co. v. Miller Creek Lbr. Go., 138 Ky. 372,
128 S. W. 96 and Hazel & Co. v. Mcloskey, 6 K. L. R. 736.
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Section 162. In What Cases Assent to an Assignment of a
Right or to the Delegated Performance of a Duty Precludes
Subsequent Objection.
(1) If in a contract the obligor manifests assent to the
future assignment of a right, or the obligee manifests assent to
the future delegation of the'performance of a duty, the power of
assignment or delegation in accordance with the terms of the
manifested assent exists despite any subsequent objection.
(2) If such assent is manifested after the creation of a
contract, the assent is similarly effective if it is given for suffi-
cient consideration or the facts are such that an informal prom-
ise would be binding or if, in reasonable reliance on the manifes-
tation, a material change of position takes place. Comment on
Subsection (1) :
a. The obligor's assent to assignment is often expressed in
a contract by the addition of the words "or his assigns" after
the promisee's name.
Annotation:
Generally the assent of the obligor is not essential to the validity
of an assignment-Wallins Creek Collieries Co. v. Saylor, 214 Ky. 206,
289 S. W. 1095; Philadelphia Veneer d Lbr. Co. v. Garrison, 160 Ky.
329, 169 S. W. 714; Newby v. Hill, 59 Ky. (2 Metc.) 539. But there are
cases where the right is not assignable because of the effect of the
assignment on the obligor (Secs. 151 and 152) and here the assent or
"ratification" by the obligor precludes subsequent objections-Pulaski
Stave Co. v. Miller Creek Lbr. Co., 138 Ky. 372, 128 S. W. 96. Asient
by an obligor to a partial assignment does not prevent him from ob-
jecting to a suit by the assignee--Jarman v. Howard "E Co., 10 Ky (3
A. K. M.) 383-but it probably takes away his right to pay the as-
signor although notice alone would not have this effect-See cases
cited under Sec. 156. It is also said that assent to the delegation of
a duty precludes a subsequent objection that the contract called for
personal service-F. Haag & Bros. v. Reichert, 142 Ky. 298, 134 S. W.
191.
There is a distinction between assent to the assignment and a
promise to the assignee. If the latter, and the assignee is prejudiced,
the obligor is estopped to deny the validity of the claim-Stone v. Hart,
23 K. L. R. 1777, 66 S. W. 191; Morrison's Adm'r. v. Beckwith, 20 Ky.
(4 T. B. M.) 73; Short v. Jackson, 2 Ky. (Sneed) 192. However, this
is only a waiver of such defenses as were known at the time-Dean v.
Skinner's Admr., 3 K. L. R. 336.
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Section 163. In What Cases an Order is an Assignment.
(1) An order by an obligee upon his obligor which is con-
ditional upon the existence of a particular duty of the obligor to
the obligee or of an indebtedness of the obligor to the obligee
which will be wholly or partially extinguished by performance.
or payment in compliance with the order, as an assignment if the
person to whom the order is given is authorized by the obligee
to retrain the performance or payment.
(2) An order which directs the drawee to render a per-
formance or make a payment irrespective of the existence of a
duty or indebtedness is not an assignment, though the drawee
is under a duty to the drawer to comply with the order and
though the order is accompanied with a direction to charge the
performance or payment to a particular account.
Annotation:
Philadelphia Veneer & Lbr. Co. v. Garrison, 160 Ky. 329, 169 S. W.
714.
Just's Adm'r. v. Woodman, 147 Ky. 493, 144 S. W. 379.
C. H. Brown Banking Co. v. Stockton, 107 Ky. 492, 54 S. W. 854.
Lutter & Voss v. G'rosse, 26 K. L. R. 585, 82 S. W. 278.
Varnon v. Chestnut, 8 K. L. R. 428.
Prichard v. Warner's Assignee, 4 K. L. R. 349.
Accord
In most of the cases cited above the order was for only part of
the debt due the drawer and was held to be irrevocable although un-
accepted by the drawee--Just's Adm'r. v. Woodman, supra. The same
was true of checks when they were treated as assignments-Farmer's
Bank and Trust Co. v. Newland, 97 Ky. 464, 31 S. W. 38; Lester & Co.
v. Given, Jones & Co. 71 Ky. (8 Bush) 357. But recent cases have held
that orders affecting part of the debt only are revocable by the drawer
at any time before acceptance by the drawee, and that before accept-
ance the drawee may ignore the order and pal the drawer-See the
annotation to See. 156.
That to be an assignment, the order cannot be absolute, but must
be conditional on a particular debt or duty, due or to bdcome due, see
Hart's Assignee v. Dixon, 5 K L. R. 669 and 602. (This must appear on
the face of the order); Just's Adm'r. v. Woodman, supra (dictum).
As to the distinction between an order that operates as an
assignment and one that creates a mere agency, see the dictum in
Philadelphia Veneer & Lbr. Co. v. Garrison, supra.
Checks were formerly assignments-BosweZZ v. Citizens Bank, 123
KY. 485, 96 S. W. 797; Farmers Bank & Trust Go. v. Newland, supra;
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Lester v. Given, supra, Buckner v. Sayre, 57 Ky. (18 B. Mon.) 745.
But this was changed in 1904 by the adoption of the Negotiable In-
struments Law-K. S. Sec. 3720b-189; Dickerson v. S2Fyder, 209 Ky.
212, 272 S. W. 384. And since that date a bank, in the absence of a
written acceptance or certification of the check, is not liable to the
payee for an arbitrary refusal to honor it-Ewing v. Citizen's Nat'l.
Bank, 162 Ky. 551, 172 S. W. 955; First 2at'l. Bank v. ITargis Com-
7nercial Bank, 170 Ky. 690, 186 S. W. 741. 1
Section 164. Interpretation of Words Purporting to
Assign a Bilateral Contract and Effect of Acceptance of the
Assignment by the Assignee.
(1) Where a party to a bilateral contract which is at the
time wholly or partially executory on both sides, purports to
assign the whole contract, his action is interpreted in the absence
of circumstances showing a contrary intention, as an assignmen+
of the assignor's rights under the contract and a delegation of
the berformance of the assignor's duties.
(2) Acceptance by the assignee of such an assignment is
interpreted, in the absence of circumstances showing a contrary
intention, as both an assent to become an assignee of the assign-
or's rights and as a promise to the assignor to assume the per-
formance of the assignor's duties.
Comment:
a. A party to a bilateral contract does not always have
clearly in mind the effect which can be produced or which he
wishes to produce, by an attempted substitution of another in
his place. He may say or write with reference to a bilateral
contract "I assign this contract," or "I assign all my rights and
obligations under this contract." By such words he purports
to assign duties as well as rights. This Section provides a rule
of interpretation in such cases, and gives as full effect to the
assignor's probable intention as the law permits.
A-nnotation:
This interpretation was given to an assignment of a bilateral
contract in F. Haag & Bros. v. Beichert, 142 Ky. 298, 134 S. W. 191.
(To be Continued.)
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IMPORTANT NOTICE TO MEMBERS
of
KENTUCKY STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
The annual meeting of the Kentucky State Bar Association will
be held in Louisville on April 4th and 5th with convention headquarters
and business meetings at the Seelbach Hotel. A fine program has been
arranged.
